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"But, amidst this exultation, I must confess, that I am continually haunted with fears, that, by-and-by, "all of a sudden, we shall find that this vigour is a momentary flash, and that, at bottom, these minis- "ters, like all the former, for many years past, will be ready to give up the rights of their country, if they "should find it necessary to the preservation of their places."——POLITICAL REGISTER, Sept 19, 1807, page 426.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES.——As the King's *Proclamation*, lately issued, relates, as to its object, solely to the American States, it will be best to continue this title to the articles, wherein that famous document is treated of.——Some remarks were, in the preceding number, offered upon the proclamation; but, after those remarks were written the demi-official defence of it has appeared in the Courier news-paper, which defence I shall, long as it is, first insert; because, not only is it fair to communicate to my readers what has been said on the side opposite to that which I take, but, it is useful to have such papers upon record, without which they could not, at any future period, be referred to. "As a difference "of opinion seems to prevail with respect "to the late Proclamation issued by Go- "vernment; it appears to be necessary to "submit to the public the following obser- "vations.——In the first place, however, "it may not be improper to bestow a word "or two upon those who have stopped to "criticise particular expressions in the Pro- "clamation, and to whom the detection of "an inelegance of expression seems to have "afforded peculiar satisfaction. The words "" make to stay," which have shocked the "ears of those delicate critics, will be found "in all the Proclamations which have been "published for the last century. "They "are the words of our fathers, and the "children have not forgotten them." It "may serve too to abate the anger of these "critics to shew that the paragraph relative "to the Algerines has been invariably used "in all proclamations for recalling seamen "for the last 100 years. And surely it is "not now so absurd a clause as it was dur- "ing the greater part of that period, now "when the Americans are a separate na- "tion, trading largely with the Mediterra- "nean, and being often the objects of the "hostility of those Corsair Powers? If we "are asked why our ancestors held out this "menace? we can only reply that they "knew the characters of their countrymen "——they knew that the idea of bondage "was worse than death; and that to hold "out the probability of slavery without re- "demption, was to present to the mind of "an Englishman a picture of intolerable "misery.——The late Proclamation has "been viewed as a concession to America, "as an adjustment of the differences with "America, as a sacrifice of the national "honor and security. We were informed "yesterday, and with pleasure we heard it, "that the mercantile interest, conceiving "it to be a concession to America, were "displeased with it. With pleasure we "heard it, because it served to strengthen "us in the opinion we have ever maintain- "ed, that the patriotism of the monied in- "terest has not, as some simpletons have "told us, decreased in the ratio of the in- "crease of their wealth, and that they have "indeed been ignorant of the character of "British merchants, who characterized "them as preferring their interest to the "honor of the country, and ready to sa- "crifice the grand principles upon which "the glory and greatness of the nation rest "to the sordid principle of gain ——The "Americans have so few ships of war that "they can care less about our searching them "than our searching their merchant ships "—and if they have felt, or affected "to feel a great sensibility and sense of "wounded honour at the affair of the *Che- "sapeake*, it is less, we suspect, because "they supposed we were exercising a prin- "ciple we had never exercised before, than "because they hoped by the display of "their passion and their regret to surprise "us into concessions upon the question of "the search of their merchant ships. That "is their sore and tender point—they "would, we have no doubt, abandon their "objections to our searching their ships of "war, or indeed give us up their ships of "war, if we would consent to let their "merchantmen pass unvisited and un- "searched. But let us see how the ques-

" tion would have stood had we maintained " the right of searching ships of war. Some " there are, we know, who are for search- " ing all ships, because we are masters of " the seas, and for not suffering any other " power to exercise the same right against " ourselves—there is something imposing " in the idea. But could we always pre- " vent Americans searching our ships of " war? True we could, if our immense " naval superiority could always be brought " to bear at every point. But might it not " happen that an American frigate might " meet with an English sloop, and insist " upon exercising the same right which a " superior British force would have exercis- " ed against the American? No British " sloop would we are sure, permit a foreign " Power to search her. No. She would " nail the flag to the mast and go down ra- " ther than permit it. Here then, fresh " disputes would arise, and the principle " would be the fruitful source of acrimony, " vexation, and probably of War. We " have thus put the case, and shewed the " operation, of the principle of our insisting " upon the right of searching ships of war " of neutral nations without allowing them " a reciprocal right. Let us put the case " the other way, and suppose that we ne- " gociated upon the principle of allowing " the right of search of ships of war to be " reciprocal. We desire to visit and search " for British seamen, about six or eight " frigates, the whole of the American Na- " vy; and to accomplish that desire, we are " to allow the Americans to search our nine " hundred sail, a sixth of which are ships " of the line! Are we to suffer an Ame- " rican frigate to overhaul a British ship of " the line? We see the indignant counte- " nances of our readers, at the bare sug- " gestion of such an idea. How were mi- " nisters to act then: if they claimed the " right for us, without allowing it to be " reciprocal, they could not have in all " places, at all times, a force that should " be so superior as to prevent the Americans " from enforcing the search against us. " Hence disputes and hostile proceedings " would certainly and perhaps not unfre- " quently arise. If they claimed the right " and allowed it to be reciprocal, they " would, for the sake of searching six or " eight frigates, yield up the whole Bri- " tish navy to an American search.——But " it is represented as a concession to Ame- " rica—as a new system upon which we are " to act. During and before the 17th cen- " tury, the instructions to our officers were " to search all ships, without making any " distinction between merchantmen and " ships of war. During the last century, " nay, from the commencement of the " reign of King William, the instructions " to search ships of war were omitted. " Which of the two modes of proceeding " were to be followed—the former or the " latter?—the latter it may be said being " nearer our own times, was more likely to " be congenial to the present state of the " world—(We beg here that we may not " be supposed to have abandoned our opi- " nion with respect to the search of the " Chesapeake—it was a case sui generis— " it stands by itself: there was great pre- " vious provocation on the part of the Ame- " ricans—a daring defiance of our power— " an overbearing insolence, accompanied " with declarations which we know to be " false; the men had been paraded under " our very noses and carried off in triumph " on board the American). There are some, " who, in representing the proclamation as " a concession, seem to wish to have it un- " derstood that ministers had ordered Ad- " miral Berkeley to enforce the search of " American ships of war, but that, finding " the effect it had produced, they had since " revoked the order. The fact is, that it " formed no part of Admiral Berkeley's " orders or instructions—that it was his " own act.—But why, it may be asked, did " ministers bring forward the prohibition to " search neutral ships of war so prominent- " ly now? In the first place let it be re- " collected that they accompanied that pro- " hibition, with as prominent an expres- " sion of their determination to search mer- " chant ships. They wished, no doubt, to " give notice to the American government, " that they should make all questions relative " to the enticing or receiving British seamen " on board American ships of war, ques- " tions as between government and govern- " ment—that, according to the degree in " which that system was adopted, they " would make it either the cause of re- " monstrance, perhaps even of reprisal if " necessary, or even should the system be " pertinaceously persisted in, of war.— " Every one must see that however govern- " ments may be ignorant of what passes on " board merchant ships, they cannot be ig- " norant, and are therefore responsible for " the conduct adopted by their ships of " war, the names of the officers in which, " and the quality and description of their " crews, cannot be unknown to them.—— " Ministers no doubt wished also to separate " the two points of searching ships of war " and merchantmen, and to mark in a

" broad and distinguished manner their de-
" termination not to abandon the right of
" searching American merchantmen which
" swarm on the seas, and are perhaps as
" 500 to 1 when compared with the num-
" ber of their ships of war.—They might
" desire too to prove to the American go-
" vernment, that whatever might be their
" feelings or determination with respect to
" the affair of the Chesapeake, not the
" smallest idea of making any sacrifice or
" modification of the right of searching
" merchant ships, entered into those feel-
" ings or that determination. When per-
" sons talk of concessions to America, let
" them recollect that part of the proclama-
" tion which relates to letters of naturali-
" zation, or certificates of citizenship from
" foreign states, and which lays down the
" principle, that no such letters or certifi-
" cates shall or can divest British seamen of
" their allegiance to their lawful sovereign.
" This is the first time, we believe, that
" this principle has been broadly laid down
" in any proclamation.——And now with
" respect to the idea that this proclamation
" is to be considered as conceding so much
" to the Americans, that the differences
" may be considered as adjusted between
" the two countries. Ministers certainly
" did not intend this prohibition to search
" ships of war as any concession—they no
" doubt weighed the subject maturely, and
" they felt that they could not allow a reci-
" procal right without making the balance
" of advantage infinitely on the side of
" America. It is not by any means to be
" considered as an adjustment of the dif-
" ferences with America—if it were, if the
" American ministers had thought it so,
" why have not long ago the negociations
" been brought to an amicable conclusion
" in this country? It were impertinent
" for us to pretend to know any thing of the
" progress of the negociations or of the
" state in which they are; but as ministers
" were no doubt ready long since to have com-
" municated to Mr. Munro or Mr. Pinck-
" ney their determination not to claim or
" enforce the right of searching ships of
" war, the negociation would have, 'ere
" this, terminated, had America resolved to
" content herself with that determination?
" Besides, if the proclamation could be
" considered as tantamount to an adjustment
" of the differences between the two coun-
" tries, why, it may be asked, is Mr.
" Rose going on a special mission to Ameri-
" ca? Of the nature of that mission we
" cannot, of course, know any thing, but
" surely it requires no great sagacity to dis-
" cover that it must have some relation to
" the points in dispute between the two
" countries. That the Americans will not
" hazard a contest we have always been of
" opinion; but we do not think by any
" means that the proclamation is to be con-
" sidered as any adjustment of our dif-
" ferences with them."——In order to get the rubbish out of the way, and to clear the ground whereon to remark upon the contents of this article, as a defence of the proclamation, we will first dispatch the concluding part of it, wherein we are asked, " why, if the proclamation is to be consi-
" dered as an adjustment of the differences
" with America, Mr. Rose is now sent up-
" on a special mission thither?" Aye, *why*, indeed, is he sent thither, whether the proclamation is to be considered as an adjustment of the differences, or not? But, this question should be put to old George Rose and the rest of the set. We, who shall have to pay so dearly for the travels of the reversionary Clerk of the Parliaments, cannot tell, or guess, what use *to us* the mission can be of; and, it is most grossly insolent to produce as a proof, that the proclamation is wise and vigorous, that we are to pay for sending a man to America to explain it to the government of that country. One of the faults, that has been complained of, is, that the proclamation, while it evades and shuffles and blusters and whines, *settles* nothing; and, in answer to this complaint, which is a very heavy one, we are bid to look at a proof of the truth complained of, and, in that proof, to behold a considerable and lasting addition to our taxes.——Taking the defence, now, in its due order, the verbal criticism is the first point that attracts our notice. The use of the phrase " make to stay" is justified upon the ground of their having been made use of heretofore upon all similar occasions; and then the defender breaks out in a sublime and pathetic quotation: " They are the words of our fathers,
" and the children have *not forgotten* them." What! *make to stay?* Oh, the wonderful merit of having remembered that noble saying of our fathers, *make to stay!* Nay more, " *stop and make to stay*"! Oh! dear, glorious, and ever-memorable words, the blessed bequest of our gallant fathers!—But, there were *other* " words of our fathers," which this defender and his clients seem to think may as well be pretty completely forgotten. Our fathers, for instance, contended, and maintained, that England had a real *sovereignty of the sea*; that the sea, round about her even to all the opposite shores, was her *own*; that she had a right to do

thereon whatever any one had to do upon lands that were his exclusive property; amongst the rules for the exercising of her dominion thereon, one was, that her ships of war should, when they saw occasion, search the ships of war of neutral nations, for English seamen; and, when her ships of war did make such search, producing a complaint from neutral nations, the answer which "our fathers" gave was, "*such is* "*and always has been our right, and, by* "*God, we will maintain it.*" These, too, as will be seen by searching the records of the English admiralty, were the words of our fathers; and, I imagine, the reader will think them full as worthy of being remembered as the words "*stop and make to stay,*" the simplicity of which, when hashed up with the modern half-poetry half-prose of the "Captain" of Eton, produces an effect somewhat like that which would arise upon seeing lord Erskine of Clackmannan in the ruff and beard of Sir Thomas More, or the Duke of York in the long-skirted coat and jack-boots of Buonaparté.—As to the declaration relative to those British seamen, who, after voluntarily entering into the service of foreign states, shall be captured and held in slavery by the kings of Africa, there is not, that I can perceive, any other objection to it than its splenetic appearance. It forms one of a list of threats; which threats are all against the *defenceless*, while nothing is distinctly threatened against any party that can reasonably be supposed ever to possess the capacity of self-defence.——This writer says, that he heard *with pleasure*, that the people in the city were displeased at the proclamation, as containing the expression of a sacrifice of our national rights; and, that his pleasure arose from the reflection, that this was a proof of the truth of what he before believed, namely, that "the patriotism of the *monied interest* "had not, as some simpletons aver, "decreased with the increase of wealth." Now, first, I disbelieve the fact. I do not believe, that what this writer calls the "monied interest," and from the dawn of which interest we may date the decline of England, were at all displeased with the proclamation; and, if they were, I should be inclined to attribute their displeasure to any thing but patriotism. The truth is, that they never think upon subjects of this sort but as the questions and measures affect themselves. They have had no feeling at all connected with the proclamation; and the contrary is merely supposed for the purpose of paying a compliment to them, which purpose, were there no concurrent testimony, sufficiently shows the origin of this mean and shuffling defence of the proclamation.——But, we are told, that there is *no* concession to the Americans; that we have not claimed the right of searching neutral ships of war; and that, therefore, we give nothing up now. Afterwards, indeed, it is acknowledged, that during and before the 17th century, we did claim and exercise this right; but that, we have abandoned it since; and, that now, "it was more "proper to follow the practice of the age "nearest us, as *more likely to be congenial* "*to the present state of the world.*" Away goes, then, in the twinkling of an eye, all the high talk about raising ourselves to the extraordinary circumstances of the times; about, resorting to our "*ancient* and indu- "bitable rights upon the seas, which rights "had been suffered to be dormant, when "Europe was balanced as to power;" away goes all this, at once, and we are now told, that the settled practice during the last hundred years is quite sufficient for all our purposes! Just the thing for the present state of the world!——It is, however, false to say, that we ever till now abandoned the right. To search *all* neutral ships for British sailors has *always* formed part of the instructions to all our naval commanders. Of course, they formed part of Admiral Berkeley's instructions, and he did nothing without due authority, except offering the Americans permission to search *his* ships.—— This right is now abandoned; and, at what time is it abandoned? Why, at the moment when the Americans have in force a proclamation depriving us of all the benefits which we enjoyed under our treaty of amity with them; at the moment when they are engaged in the commission of an hostile act against us; at a moment when they are doing us all the harm which it is, under any circumstances, in their power to do us; at a moment when they are excluding our ships of war from their ports, and receiving with open arms those of our enemy, while, on our side, we have taken no one step in the way of retaliation; at this moment it is, that our ministers come out with a proclamation, conceding the point upon which the hostile proclamation of America solely arose, and making that concession the basis of negociation as to other points. And this they call vigour!——Great stress is, however, laid upon the explicitly expressed determination not to recede from the right of searching *merchant* ships. That is to say, that they have not given up that which the Americans did not ask them to give up. There is, indeed, an insinuation in another defence of this proclamation, that the Americans *have*

asked them to give up that also. But, they, like other nations, ask what they do not expect to get; and, if they were to insist upon it, as it is very probable they may do *now*, my opinion is, that that also will be given up, and if it be, the abandonment will not, while *taxes* can be raised in England, want defenders. This searching of the merchant ships, is, this writer tells us, the *sore* place with the Americans. The fact is otherwise. They have their *vanity* to gratify; and our wiseacre vigorous men have afforded them food for it. The former will compare this proclamation to the famous *Declaratory Act*; or, as I did, in the case of Pitt's taking out the Lillies, to the conduct of the *hunted Beaver*. The Americans are not to be deceived by mere words. They know, that all the bluster is for show, and that all the abandonment is for real practice. ——In the next argument, this defender admits, to its full extent, the doctrine of *equality* upon the seas, which has, by all the partizans of the ministers, been, from the moment that this dispute began, so strongly reprobated. Suppose, says he, we had, as *some persons* contend we ought to have, maintained our right of searching American ships of war. *Could* we have done it without permitting them to search ours? Might it not happen, that, in spite of our great naval superiority, an American frigate would search an English sloop, if she happened to meet her alone? "Here, then, fresh disputes would "arise, and the principle would be a fruit-"ful source of acrimony, vexation, and, "probably, of *war*." So, the *fear* of our arms was to do nothing? Our insisting upon the principle was not to induce the Americans to submit to it, without insisting upon a perfect equality? And we wanted, I'll warrant, the *power* to assert our sovereignty in any part of the sea where our fleets did not happen to be actually stationed? The tax-gatherer goes to many a man, who would very much like not to pay him. To many a man much stronger than himself, and yet he pays him very quietly, as soon as he can scrape the money together. The exciseman searches the house of many a man, who, were there nobody but him and the exciseman in the world, would kick him into the street before his feet were well over the threshold. In these cases, the cause which produces non-resistance and submission, is, the knowledge, that, *elsewhere*, there is *a power to punish resistance*; and this knowledge, in the case supposed, is to have no effect at all! But, the enforcing of this principle might, possibly, lead to *war*. Horrid thing, to be sure; but what may *not* lead to war? It would lead to only *one* war; for, by that war the matter would be settled for ever; and, observe, that this very wiseacre states, that according to the *complaining* system, now to be adopted, *war* is to be the final remedy.——It is to be observed, that the proposition of Lord Stanhope, that all nations were perfectly equal in point of rights upon the seas, and which proposition was rejected by the noble Lords, is now promulgated in a proclamation, as explained by the defenders of that proclamation; and, every argument, used by the Morning Chronicle, against the partizans of the ministry, is now used by those partizans against those who disapprove of the proclamation. Never was triumph more complete than that obtained by that paper over its opponents!——Having stated, that, to assert the right in question without acknowledging a similar right in the Americans, must produce ill-blood, and, probably, war, this defender next tells us, that the Americans have not above eight frigates, and that it would be foolish in us to expose our thousand ships of war to be searched for the sake of searching their eight ships. Foolish enough, indeed; "but, "*what*, then, were ministers to do?" How I hate this slang of the offices: "ministers," without the article before it. This, at any rate, was not the language of our fathers. It is the slang of modern battling corrupt place-hunting factions. "What were they to do?" Why nothing but let things remain as they were; nothing but let the officers of the navy exercise the right of search; for, as to the risk of *producing war*, if that is to be considered as a sufficient reason for forbearance, what right could ever be exercised that was hostile to the interests of any foreign nation.——The *time*, too, of issuing this sneaking proclamation was the very worst that could have been chosen. If at all, it should have been the moment that authentic intelligence was received of the affair of the Chesapeake. Coming after the threats of the American government had arrived, and particularly after the hostile conduct of that government had been made known here, it must be considered as the effect of fear, as doing that which "ministers," to use the Downing Street slang, thought they should be compelled to do. And, it is impossible not to believe, that this giving up of the great point at issue will have the worst possible effect upon any negociation (I almost laugh at the idea) which we are now about to carry on with America. We are desired to look at the proclamation for an instance of *vigour* in the declaration about the *certificates of citizenship*; but, at this the Ameri-

cans will laugh most heartily, knowing very well, that it will make no real alteration in the state of things, and that the declaration is mere sound.——But, some one will say, "what could have been the *motive* of the "ministers, in issuing such a proclamation?" Precisely of the sort that Pitt's motives used to be, when, after having bragged and blustered for a month or two, he, all of a sudden, did exactly what those, to him, useful persons, the opposition, had blamed him for not doing, and then, in their hearts, cursed him for doing. "I am sure," used he to say, in his opening harangues, "that "there is one transaction alluded to in "the Speech from the throne, that the "honourable gentlemen opposite will ap-"prove of," sniggering to himself all the while, and they nodding assent with their hearts full of bitterness, while the poor nation stood gaping on, like so many bumkins at the mummery of a mountebank and his man. It was a clever trick to shut up the mouths of those who would have made some good three-hour speeches about aggression and violence; and, what is more, it would probably save some half score of those pithy monosyllables, that are more valuable than long speeches.——This was the constant practice of Pitt, and, for the purpose of keeping his place, an excellent practice it was.——Thus will it be, I am fully persuaded, as to measures with respect to other nations. The *high talk* will be tried; but, if that will not do, it will be laid aside; the advice of the "gentlemen opposite" will be adopted; and some peace, much worse than that of Amiens, will be made.

PORTUGAL.——The talk of an expatriation of the Portuguese government still occupies the public; and one of those luminaries of the world, the London news papers, observes, that it will be "a spectacle "worthy of angels to see *a people*, rather "than lose their independence, flee to a "distant land, there to erect the altars and "keep alive the flame of liberty." But, what does this sublime writer mean by *a people*? Does he really suppose, that the people of Portugal are actually going to ship themselves off to the Brazils? Does he suppose, that the fleet, like Noah's Ark, will carry away animals and all? Why, man, the people of Portugal are to remain, and, therefore, let what will become of the government, they must lose whatever they have to lose by the change. I know not whether there be any *Whitehall* in Portugal; but, if there be, I can easily form an idea of the confusion, the uproar, the weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth that must there prevail at this moment. What lamentations and shrieking and wringing of hands and tearing of hair there must be amongst the place-men and place-women, and pensioners of both sexes. If there be a Whitehall at Lisbon, the alarm from the earthquake was a trifle compared to the alarm of this day. And yet the Morning Chronicle tells us, that the people are perfectly tranquil; that they have not only dry eyes, but that they stand by and see their government packing up for exportation, with as much indifference, as if it were one of those cargoes of grape juice and brandy, which they have been accustomed to see shipped off to the sots of England. Incredible! What a scrambling, too, there must be, if the Government should really sail away! The few days (for there must be some) that will pass before the arrival of the French, will be spent in plunder and devastation. All the nice trim houses of our factory will be gutted to the very walls. There will be pillage in every quarter going on at one and the same moment. Strength of body will be a valuable endowment, and, as the Edinburgh Reviewers observe, talents, by their natural buoyancy, will rise to the higher regions of things. But, alas for talents, such as theirs! There will be no occupation for speculating political parasites and place-hunters. The very ground will slide from beneath them. Their tongues and pens will alike be useless; they will be reduced to the proper alternative: hang or starve. If there be any news-papers in Portugal, the lot of their editors, if they out-live the few days of no-government, will not be so bad; for editors of journals will be wanted; and they are not of the true breed, unless they will be perfectly disposed to praise Napoleon as loudly as ever they did their former sovereign, whom they will not scruple to speak of with contempt and scorn. The players, too, will, if they are not bastards of their kind, suit both their tragedies and their comedies to the times; and, however lofty some of their present connexions may be, they will shift their endearments with as much facility as they do their dresses, despising more than others their former admirers, because they know them better. But the Whitehall of Portugal, if there be one, is the apparition that haunts me, day and night. I sometimes think I see the lords and secretaries, the confidential servants of a gracious sovereign, come tumbling out of the doors and windows with all their clerks, door-keepers, and sweepers, and waggon-loads of papers and red tape at their heels. And yet the Morning Chroni-

cle tells me, that "the people of Portugal "are *perfectly tranquil!*"——I must observe, and, that, too, with some little vexation, that I do not perceive many persons here ready to enter into my feelings of anxiety for the Portuguese government; and, I have sometimes been inclined to think, that we really are that cold people which the French and others have described us to be. Perhaps this want of sympathy may arise from the circumstance of there being no *parliament* in that country. There, I hope, we should all have but one feeling.——In one or two of the newspapers, some hints are thrown out respecting the advantage, which *we* may derive from the transportation of our ally, her most faithful majesty, and her government, to South America; and, indeed, such an event would give us a pretty good chance of being obliged to pay an additional million annually for ambassadors and secretaries and all the long-train of diplomatic connection with a government at such a distance. Ambassadors would, of course, be shifted and pensioned off, as they are now, at every change of ministry; and, if we had a royal ally at the Brazils, we should have an ambassador or two continually afloat. What charming work this would be! What numbers of the booby sons would be inspired with a passion for visiting South America! And, then, there would, in all probability, be an English fleet and army wanted to get things into a settled state at the Brazils; and what Englishman, of any generosity (particularly if the money did not come out of his own pocket), would refuse a subsidy, under such circumstances, to our ancient ally?——I see, for my part, a vast field opening in this transportation project; but, *how* it can "*annoy* Nap leon," as the wiseacre of the Courier seems to expect, I cannot, I must confess, perceive. He will go, and take possession of Portugal, and will give it to whomsoever he pleases, and lay it under what tribute he pleases. It is so much of clear gains; and why need he trouble himself with what is doing in South America, where he is not seeking to make conquests at all? What he wants is to be master of all Europe; what his relations and generals want, is, to be kings and princes in Europe; how are they, then, to be annoyed by the voluntary transportation of the old governments to South America? How can this possibly "annoy" them?—— Europe, *as it was*, will be no more. The thing is done. The European revolution is made; it is struck, and has only to receive a little rounding and polishing. Luxury, effeminacy, debauchery, cowardice, had arrived at the point when their destructive effects necessarily broke out against governments, which only partook in the vices of the people. You may as well hope to stop rain, in its way to the earth, as to stop the progress of these effects, without removing the causes of them. And, have we any where seen an attempt to remove those causes? Have we not, on the contrary, observed, that, in every country subdued by France, there has been the old scenes of frivolity and debauchery and corruption exhibited, even to the very hour of the conqueror's arrival. It never seems to have entered into the mind of any one government, that its danger arose from its own faults, or faults within the reach of its correction. For defence, the governments have uniformly had recourse to the means usually employed against enemies like themselves; and, the wonder is, not that such means should have failed, but, that they should have afforded one hour's respite. Uniformly, without one single exception, we have been assured of the unshaken *loyalty* of the people, in the countries about to be invaded by France; and, without one exception also, we have found, in the end, that the people received the French with open arms. Now, there must be some substantial reason for this; some cause of settled growth; something quite different from the *seductions* of the French, and the enchanting novelty of their principles. The cry of liberty and equality might do something; but, now that France is become a monarchy again, now that she scouts the principle of liberty and equality, we see no more disposition in the people to resist her than we saw before. Nay, in America, where the people are merely distant spectators of this revolutionary scene, we see, that the decided partiality for France has not been at all diminished by the changing of her government from a democratical republic to an absolute monarchy. While she called herself a republic, that was the express ground upon which her American partizans justified their partiality. They deceived themselves. Their partiality arose from an admiration of the genius and courage and fortitude of the French, operating as a chastisement of vices, which it is natural to man to hate, or to despise——In spite, however, of the numerous proofs of these truths; in spite of the woeful experience of eighteen succeeding years, each year rising above the former in the awfulness of its lessons, our newspaper writers still hold out to us the hope of *delivering* Europe, without including amongst the means, a re-

formation of those abuses, which have produced its subjugation. "This act of rigour," says one of them, speaking of the affair of Copenhagen, "has already elicited an electric spark, which has given a shock to the "morbid feelings of the Continent; and, if "we boldly follow it up with correspondent "measures may yet accomplish much towards its deliverance. It may be the "means of separating Russia from an alliance, which she is already beginning to "contemplate with disgust; which is a foul "stain upon her honour; and which if continued, will involve her in inevitable destruction. It may also be the means of "*awakening Austria* from her ruinous "trance, and of stimulating her to concert "measures, which may eventually contribute *to redeem the violated rights of mankind.*——As for Bonaparte, he may continue safe as long as his armies continue "faithful, and as long as the *terror of his despotism* can preserve a counterpoise to "the *exasperation* of public opinion. But "his generals may have ambition as well as "himself, and his armies, like himself, "may require a respite from the perils of "battle, and the fatigues of the camp. "*The favour of the multitude*, even under "a *legitimate* government, is a frail and perishable possession; with his title to it, "can we then expect it to be impregnable? "A feeling of interest in the power and "prosperity of the government, may, "moreover, be subdued by the *miseries of "personal subjection*, and the splendor of "national glory may be eclipsed by the "clouds of *individual affliction.* These "causes are *possibly secretly* producing "their effect, and *the mine may explode in "the citadel of fancied security.* Should "the tide of *popular indignation once decidedly turn against him*; should the pressure of suffering once become so intense "as to enflame the enthusiastic contagion "of generous despair, and stimulate the determined resolution of just revenge, *this "monster may still be condemned to pay the "tremendous forfeit of his unparalleled "crimes.*"——That electric spark, of which this writer speaks, has escaped my observation; nor have I seen any signs whatever of a separation of Russia from her alliance with France. "Awaken Austria from her "trance!" Awaken her *to what?* What measures is she to concert for the redemption of the violated rights of mankind? And, besides, what does this writer mean by *rights* and by *mankind?* Who are the persons that have *suffered* from the conquests of the French? Let this first be shewn; let it be shewn, that the mass of the people in Holland, in Italy, and in Germany have suffered from the change which their governments have undergone, before we talk of the violated rights of *mankind.* I do not say, that they have *not* suffered; but, a writer who assumes a tone like this, and who bids us hope for the deliverance of Europe, should prove to us first, that the people of Europe *wish* to be delivered.——Still, too, though in the face of experience to the contrary, we are invited to hope for safety from the hatred of the French people to their sovereign, for endeavouring to stimulate them to hatred against which sovereign, be it remembered, that, in our own courts of justice, Mr. Peltier was tried and convicted, to the clearly expressed satisfaction of this same writer and his numerous associates, including the editors of the Edinburgh Review, the latter being quite lavish of their abuse upon him! But, what foundation have we for this hope? Is there any authentic document, whereon we can lay our finger, and say, "here is a proof that the "people of France hate Napoleon?" Is there any such proof of an "exasperation in "the public mind; of the miseries of sub"jection; of individual affliction?" If there be any such proofs, let us have them. ——It is curious, too, to see "the *favour "of the multitude*" first represented as "a "*frail and perishable possession,*" and, in the very next sentence, to be told, that, "if the tide of *popular indignation* once "turn against him, the monster may yet "be condemned to pay the tremendous forfeit of his unparalleled crimes." I like this last idea best; and, may *all* the unpunished tyrants, whether military or civil, whether ruling by the sword or by the terrors of unjust judgment, take warning by the times! But, I see no *symptoms* of discontent in France. The causes of Napoleon's destruction are, possibly, we are told, "se"cretly" at work. Possibly, indeed, but we know nothing of it; and there may, possibly, be no such causes in existence. The "*terrors* of his despotism" may, for aught I know, be great, but, be that as it may, these terrors are exercised by Frenchmen themselves; and, as to the probable designs of his generals against him, though such designs may be entertained, it is very evident that he fears them not; or we should not see him leave France for six months at a time. Princes do not leave home, when they suspect that they have rivals there, particularly if those rivals are amongst their generals. He is at this moment travelling to Italy, while he is sending a general to take

possession of Portugal. And yet, we are to believe, that his crown totters upon his head. In almost the same breath, we are desired to believe, that the royal family of Portugal are beloved, nearly to adoration, by the people; and then we are told, that that people stand and look on, indifferent spectators, of the expatriation of that same family. Nay, now that the pinch is come, it is, by these same writers, conjectured, that the royal family will hasten away before the French have actually entered Portugal, "lest *that circumstance* being known, might *encourage* the "populace to commit acts of *violence* and "*outrage*."——Let us not be deceived any longer. Napoleon is quite sufficiently established in power at home, and is the most formidable enemy that England ever had to meet. Our means both of defence and of offence are surprisingly great, when compared with our population; but, if the hour of *invasion* comes, and come, first or last, it will, in some part or other of the kingdom, those means will avail us nothing, unless *the people* are chearfully disposed to employ them; and, for them to be so disposed, they must be convinced, that a change of government *would be for the worse*. They must be well convinced of this, or, like the people of Portugal, as described by the Morning Chronicle, and now described by the Courier, they will look with perfect indifference at the confusion and the dismay of the government, and will only wait for actual invasion, as the signal for committing acts of violence and outrage. Those who thrive upon corruption may wrap themselves up in the hope, that no day of reckoning will ever come; and, they may flatter themselves, that the people will always submit to the effects of those corruptions, rather than run the risk of greater evils. But *so hoped* and *so reckoned* all the corrupt combinations in the countries upon the continent!

The letter of DUN SCOTUS, inserted in my last sheet, at page 657, shall be attended to in my next; but, in the mean while, I must observe, that the *words* of the preamble of Mr. Whitbread's bill cannot, in fair dealing, be separated from the main object of the *whole set of poor bills*, with which that gentleman menaced us; nor from the *speech*, with which he introduced the parochial school-bill. True, the education was to produce good morals, but this merely for the purpose of preventing laziness and those other vices, which more immediately tend to increase the *poor-rates*.

Botley,
Oct. 29, 1807.

WEST INDIA COMMERCE.

SIR,——You deserve the thanks of your country, for your masterly and truly English publications, concerning the course which we ought to pursue respecting our Domination of the Sea, and particularly towards America; that country which, as you observe, has succeeded the Dutch in milking the cow, while others were fighting for the horns. I have lately seen a pamphlet relative to this subject, published under the smooth title of "Oil without Vinegar;" and I send you some remarks which occurred to me on reading it. The *oily* author sets out with a fulsome parade of impartiality, that naturally excites those suspicions, which the sequel of his work so fully verifies. He tells us, (p. 6) that "having lived nearly as long in England as he did in America (his native country), he feels a great attachment to both nations, and thinks he feels a tolerable degree of impartiality, and confesses he is very desirous of preventing hostilities between the two nations." I cannot say, that I believe him to be equally correct in these two representations of his feelings. I can readily admit, that he "feels a tolerable impartiality towards both countries;" that is, that he does not care sixpence for either, except in so far as his selfish interest is concerned; and, I can believe, that he may be "very desirous of preventing hostilities between them," by the sacrifice of the rights and interests of England, as conceiving that his selfish interest may be hurt by the maintenance of those rights and interests. But *no man can serve two masters:* and that he or any other person can at the same time feel a great real attachment to two nations, I think as little credible, as that a woman can be strongly attached, and preserve a loyal fidelity to two husbands at the same time. I feel no such amphibious indifference, and put no faith in such impartial advisers. To borrow an image of Mr. Burke, I would not leave to such an arbitrator my right to a fish pond, being well convinced, that if he gave me the land, he would give the water and the fish to my adversary, and that his only object would be to render the transaction subservient to his own advantage. If the professions of these half-and-half gentry are true, what are they but beings released from the strongest tie of social connexion, who when they change their climate shift off their allegiance with their clothes, whose country is that region, where they can for the moment make the largest gains, and who in discussing the conflicting claims of nations, are swayed from the balancing *impartiality*

of their own apathy, by the smallest influence of their selfish interest? If their professions are untrue—I shall only say

"An open foe may prove a curse,
"But a pretended friend is worse."

One most striking feature in this curious performance is the uniform and total want of attention to fairness or accuracy, with which every matter of every description—great or small—of fact or of argument—of history or of conjecture—is represented. In p. 13, the author says, that "he finds in the report of the committee of the House of Commons" (see your Register of August 22, for the Report without that part of it called the Appendix) "the examination of a Mr. Henry Shirley, who *he concludes* is a West India planter." Now, Sir, by these words "he concludes" the fact is evidently intended to be left in doubt. What then shall we think of the accuracy of this *oily* gentleman, when turning to the Report itself, p. 66, we find that the very first words uttered by Mr. Shirley, and the whole of his tessimony, shewed, that he had been a planter from the year 1773, to the day when he appeared before the committee; and that he had resided in Jamaica *as a planter* 20 years? In p. 14, the author, Mr. Mascall Medford, after saying that "there seems to be much candour and good sense in Mr. Shirley's answers," professes to annex part of the examination of Mr. S. consisting of two questions, with the answers to them. The latter question and answer he gives thus. *Question*, "Would the British planter's market for rum be injured by a monopoly of their supply being granted to the British North American colonies?" *Answer*. "It would make the planter still more dependent on the British merchants, who cannot be very indulgent in such times as these. They seem to pity our case, but they add to our miseries by always deriving a profit from our distresses." Knowing Mr. Shirley to be a man of an uncommonly clear head, and acute understanding, and presuming that the members of the committee of the House of Commons were not perfect ideots, I could not believe, particularly when by the perusal of Mr. Mascall Medford's own pamphlet, I had learned to set a proper value on his authenticity.—I could not believe, that Mr. Shirley should have uttered, or that the committee should have been satisfied with such words, as an answer to such a question. Upon looking into the Report, p.67, I found that Mr. Mascall Medford, had, agreeably to his system, suppressed *twenty seven lines out of thirty*; and, in truth, given only the introduction of Mr. Shirley's answer, which taken entire furnishes a very particular and satisfactory explanation of the matter inquired into. Again, p. 19, he tells us that it was the ministerial party which wished for the Spanish war of 1739, whereas every body who is acquainted with the history of that time, knows that the minister, Sir Robert Walpole, was very averse to that war, and that he was driven into it by the clamours of such men as Mr. Ma-call Medford, who would set up their wretched personal interests, as the rule for the conduct of nations.—These misrepresentations I have placed by themselves, because, I do not perceive that Mr. Mascall's argument gains any thing by them, or that it would have lost any thing by a plain statement of the truth; so that I am unable to account for them, but in one of these two ways; either that Mr. Mascall was afraid, that if he yielded to a correct representation of a fact in a matter of indifference, he might lose his expertness at misrepresentation, in cases where misrepresentation might be necessary to his object: or, secondly, that his skull is so impenetrably thick, and his intellect so imperviously cloudy, as to render him incapable of understanding and exhibiting any matter, as it really exists. Whichever of these may be the true account, you will agree with me, that the fact itself proves him to be totally unworthy of attention as a public adviser.—I will now proceed to some more important and more wicked misrepresentations of this gentleman. His third chapter is intitled, *Of the Mistatements of Writers on the Subject of the Report of the West Indian Committee, and of those who pretend to state Facts*. The specimen I have already given you of this Mr. Mascall, will probably cause you to feel some surprise, that a chapter with such a title should occur in a work of such a writer; but, before I shall have done with this same chapter, I believe you and your readers without exception, will wonder that such a chapter could be produced, even by the pen of impudence itself. The first statement which he attacks is the representation made by Mr. Wedderburn, that "sugar upon an average of eight estates in the island of Jamaica, for which he was factor, had not been made during the years 1803, 1804, 1805, 1806, at a less expence than 20s. 10d. per cwt. besides the money received for the other produce of the said estates (rum) during the same period." In order to explain and prove the fact stated, Mr. Wedderburn delivered in abstracts of the accounts of these eight estates, during the said years, (except

as to 1803 for one estate) which are printed in the report. These abstracts specify the cost of the articles sent from England, the amount of the expences incurred in the island (consisting of hired labour, taxes, lumber, salt fish, meat, flour, medical attendance, tradesmen's bills, salaries and commission to the persons having the care and conduct of the estate, &c.) the quantity of rum, and the quantity of sugar made yearly during the whole period. An average is then drawn of the British and insular expences per annum, from which is deducted the annual average money for which the rum was sold. An annual average is then drawn of the quantity of sugar made, and the average expenses over and above the whole money received for the rum is then divided by the average number of cwts. of sugar, in order to ascertain what is the proportionate cost of one cwt. These eight estates appear to be situated in two of those large divisions of the island called parishes; and they differ in size and other circumstances. Accordingly, the expences incident to them differ also; those on the least expensive (enjoying some very peculiar advantages) yielding an average of only 12s. per cwt. and those on the most costly an average of £1. 8s. 4d. per cwt. of sugar, the general average being 20s. 10d. I confess to me this exposition seems to be clear, candid, and satisfactory: but it will not do for that paragon of correctness, that model of veracity Mr. Mascall Medford. Let us hear his objections. The first is, that if the cost of making the sugar be 20s. 10d. and the expence incident to its transportation to this country and sale here be 15s. per cwt. (and the document inserted in Mascall's own appendix, No. I. proves that it is somewhat more) the cost of making, bringing it hither, &c. is greater than the average selling price. This, as applied to the coarser sugars has for a considerable time been undoubtedly true. "And, yet," says Mr. Mascall, "we see the West Indian merchants living like princes," which gives occasion to this ingenious gentleman for some fine writing about "iron bridges, wild beasts in the tower, bears, toads, and tortoises, which" it seems, "exist on nothing, but do not get fat, while the West Indian merchant lives on less than nothing and gets very fat." Now, Sir, I know nothing of these "West Indian merchants who live like princes," and, I think, after what you have seen of Mr. Medford, you will admit that a man without being very unreasonable, may ask this gentleman for some proof beyond his bare assertion of any thing which he advances; but, the fact is, that supposing what he had said to be ever so true, it is nothing to the purpose. The owner of the sugar, the person who immediately suffers, is the planter. The planter's distress is the primary grievance, it is the prominent object exhibited in the Report. The merchant suffers only through the planter. The interests of the planter and the merchant are by no means identified. In some cases they are directly opposite. This Mr. Mascall perfectly well knows; his whole pamphlet proves that he knows it. In p. 14, he quotes with approbation the expression of a planter, "they" (the merchants) "add to our miseries, by always deriving a profit from our distresses." Pp. 15, 16, are filled with whining hypocritical expressions of pity for the extortions, which the planters suffer from the merchants: he calls the merchants "blood suckers, who are drawing the planter's existence from them:" he invokes providence to interfere against their extortions: and, yet, in pp. 30, 31 of this same book, this same man alledges the wealth of the merchant as a proof of the prosperity of the planter, the wealth of him whom he describes to be an oppressor, as a proof of the prosperity of his victim. If this slippery gentleman shall say he means to include planters under the word merchants, I assert it as an indisputable fact, that many of them (I do not say all, for some of them have other resources besides their West Indian estates) are in the very jaws of absolute want. This is notorious amongst all who know any thing of West Indian concerns. In the report in question, it is proved over and over again that their estates bring them in debt. Mr. Shirley, p. 66, proves that an estate on which he had expended £170,000 yielded him last year about £5,600. The legal interest (6 per cent.) upon £170,000 is £10,200 per annum; so that here was a deficiency of £4,600: but there are many still stronger cases. Mr. Wedderburn, p. 23, gives an abstract of the receipts and exexpences upon an estate in Westmoreland, Jamaica, for the year 1801, and the five following years. It appears that, on an average of the first five years of this period, the annual receipts exceeded the annual outgoings by a balance of £2,827. This estate Mr. Wedderburn states, cost the proprietor a great deal more than £50,000, so that £2,827 the annual excess of receipts above the actual outgoings would be a great deal less than the legal interest of the money laid out. But in the last year 1806, the total receipts were £3,866, the outgoings £4913; so that not only the proprietor did not receive one farthing by way of interest on the

capital expended, but over and above that total loss his estate was an additional charge to him of £1047. This I take it was by no means a singular case; and all the persons examined concur in stating that the distress of the planters is general. In fact, the planter whose estate produces ordinary or inferior sugar (which is the case with most of the estates in Jamaica) must, if he have nothing but such an estate to depend on, be actually starving. He must sit with his family around him contemplating the prospect of irremediable ruin. When he beholds his children, he must sigh to reflect that he gave them an education, calculated to qualify them for that condition of life to which they were born, but which can now only aggravate the poignancy of their sufferings under the degradation to which they are condemned. In these circumstances, to be mocked with taunts of prosperity and wealth, to be told that his fat and thriving looks prove he must have "an art beyond that of the bear, who subsists by sucking his paws, or that of the toad who lives without light or food," is a sort of insult, which, I suppose, no man will be required to submit to in silence; and which (for the credit of our common nature, Mr. Cobbett,) I hope no man living is capable of offering, but *Mascall Medford, Esq. of Philadelphia.*—I have said that the interest of the merchant and the planter are by no means identified; they are, however, very frequently intimately connected, particularly in those cases (by far the most numerous) in which the merchant is the mortgagee of the planter's estate. Still, even in these cases it is plain, that any great distress must first fall upon the planter, nay, he may be absolutely ruined by the seizure of his estate; the Negroes and stock on which may yet be just sufficient to pay the merchant his debt. I have said too, that the interests of the merchant are sometimes directly opposite to those of the planter. I will give an instance, merchants charge their commission on the *gross* proceeds of the articles which they sell: let us suppose a duty of five shillings per cwt to be laid on sugar, and that in consequence of such duty, the gross price of sugars should rise half a crown per cwt. above what they were before: in this case it is evident, that the additional duty would be paid in equal shares by the planter and the consumer, the former receiving (neat) half a crown less for every cwt. that he sold, and the latter paying half a crown more for every hundred weight that he bought; but the merchant would not participate in the planter's loss. On the contrary, he is a gainer to the amount of his commission on the two shillings and sixpence increase in the gross price. Mr. Mascall says, "we see West India merchants living like princes; but, when they come before the parliament they have got the whining cant of beggars." To such an insolent insinuation of wilful false testimony given upon a solemn investigation, directed against such a body of men, I suppose the West Indian merchants will not condescend to make any reply: but, I will observe, that the evidence of the merchants examined, carries with it the strongest internal marks of authenticity. All who were interrogated concurred in stating, that one cause of the diminished consumption and the reduced price of sugar, was the high duties upon it. Now, Sir, I have already shewn that an increase of duty, unless it does produce a diminution of consumption and of price, is a measure of advantage to the merchants. Here, therefore, unless what they say is strictly true, they are speaking in direct opposition to their own interest; and in such a case, surely one should be inclined to give credit even to Mr. Mascall Medford himself. His next objection to Mr. Wedderburn's statement of twenty shillings and ten pence, as the average cost of making an cwt. of sugar is, that "among the chief expenses of the 20s. 10d. are loss upon bills of exchange drawn on England, and the interest of the money advanced." Now, is it credible (I do not mean to you, Mr. Cobbett, for you tell us you are conversant with American morality) to any one unacquainted with American morality, is it credible, that when this man wrote this paragraph, he had before him, as his pamphlet proves that he had, the Report of the West India committee containing Mr. Wedderburn's documents, setting forth every item both of supplies from Europe, and expenses in the island, by which it appears, that not one single farthing of expence was incurred by bills of exchange drawn on England, and that no charge whatever was made for interest on capital, or even for loss upon Negroes, though it is distinctly stated that such a loss was annually incurred? As to bills of exchange upon England, if Mr. Mascall knows any thing of the subject upon which he has taken upon himself so flippantly to write, he must know they have borne a premium; and if he does not know any thing of his subject, he should at least have suppressed his flippant pretensions to instruct the world.—His next objection is to the precision of the average cost stated to be 20s. 10d. "Indeed," says he "if the president of the board of agriculture had been asked, if he, amongst the hundreds of volumes

written on that subject, had pretended to calculate the first cost of a bushel of wheat, would he have pretended to state it to a penny?" To this triumphant question the answer is most easy and complete; indeed, I am almost ashamed to expose the fallacy of the inquiry, which is so gross, that none but a natural fool can possibly fail to detect it. To compute the average cost of raising a bushel of wheat is a matter of difficulty, because the labour, rent, machinery, charges of superintendance, and probably other items which do not at this moment occur to me, are applied to the production of it indiscriminately, with the production of a variety of other commodities of different qualities, and value, and disposed of in different manners; but a sugar estate produces nothing but sugar and rum: all the expenses therefore, incident to the culture of such an estate are employed in the production of those two articles; and as these expenses always very considerably exceed the value of the rum sold, this excess furnishes indisputable evidence of the cost of raising the whole sugar produced on that estate, and the sum of this excess divided by the number of cwts. of sugar, will exhibit as indisputable a representation of the cost of each cwt. So in England, if we should suppose a farm to produce nothing but wheat, it is manifest that not only the president of the board of agriculture, but every common farmer who can write and perform a rule of three sum, could tell with great exactness the average cost of producing every bushel of wheat produced on such a farm. He would first ascertain what had been his total expense; from that amount he would deduct what he had received for his straw and stubble, and the remainder, divided by the number of bushels of corn, would give to a farthing the precise average cost of producing each bushel.—— Nay, Sir, so fatally does this fetid *Oil without Vinegar*, discolour every thing that it touches; so undeviatingly does this Mr. Mascall Medford falsify every thing of which he writes, that though from what I have already stated, the expences attending the culture of wheat are not so easily distinguishable as those of sugar, yet I will venture to guess (and he must be a sorry guesser whose conjecture shall not be nearer the truth, than one of Mr. Mascall Medford's loose assertions) that among the hundreds of volumes written upon agriculture, about which he speaks so fluently, (and I will answer for him so ignorantly) there shall not be found one out of five treating practically on raising wheat, which shall not contain calculations, exhibiting that very cost which he so peremptorily asserts is incapable of being calculated. Seasons and situations will cause differences in the cost of producing wheat, as well as sugar. He therefore, who wished for an extensive average, should exhibit the results of different seasons and different situations. Mr. Wedderburn has done this. He has exhibited the results upon eight estates, in different situations (being as I understand his evidence the whole number with which he is connected), during six successive years, not one of which as it appears was marked by any circumstances which could render the culture of sugar more costly than ordinary. I am not at all afraid to submit to the candour of any one of your readers (not being an American) to determine whether these data, are or are not sufficient grounds for the deduction of the average stated.—With these facts before his eyes, and without a shadow of evidence in disproof of them, (indeed it is manifestly impossible to disprove them, but by shewing Mr. Wedderburn has exhibited forged documents), Mr. Mascall has yet the effrontery to state, that 20s. 10d. is the price "at which sugar might be sold in the West Indies with a reasonable profit, after having paid exorbitant prices for slaves, as well as of all sorts of materials imported from Europe."—This is an absurdity of the same kind, (though much higher in degree) as it would be to tell an English gentleman who farmed his own estate, that if he could every year sell his produce for what the cultivation of his farm had cost him, without including any thing for rent, he would have reasonable profit. The design of this impartial adviser in this misrepresentation, is to steel the hearts of Englishmen, against the distresses of their countrymen; and as he had before attempted to excite animosities between the planters and the merchants, so he now strives to provoke the enmity of the nation against both, that his other country, America, may profit by our dissentions.—Such is the *train oil* which flows in copious streams through every part of this American fabric, and, I must say, that the foul article in which Mr. Mascall so largely deals, seems to have an affinity marvelously animating to his brain. Like Curl in the Dunciad,

> "Aided by *blubber's* sympathetic *grease*
> "Vig'rous he rises, from th' effluvia strong
> "Imbibes new life, and scours and stinks along."

But as the odour is somewhat too powerful for most English nerves, I will make but a small addition to the samples which I have already drawn off; and having hitherto illustrated the veracity, I will now briefly bear

testimony to the political wisdom, of this enlightened and disinterested counsellor of the statesmen in the new and in the old world. In case of a war with America, he says, p. 62, "It is by privateering that America will do the greatest injury to Great Britain. From the number of ships which she will have ready to fit out, I conceive it will be almost impossible to carry on any trade to the West Indies, but such as would be attended with ruin to all parties. In the American war, West India premiums got up from 5 guineas to 23 guineas in the summer, and the under writers were ruined. At present, I do not suppose if a war breaks out, that 40 guineas would pay from Jamaica." The gentleman's logic seems to be this: "Because, in the American war, when France had a navy—when Spain had a navy—when Holland had a navy—and when America also had a considerable number of privateers—when all these acted against England, and when the two first mentioned parts of this force were sufficient to make the grand fleet of England retire before them in the British Channel itself, and even to threaten the arsenal and citadel of Plymouth, and at the same time to maintain very large fleets in every other quarter of the globe; because, under these circumstances, the force which Great Britain could spare for the protection of her West Indian fleets, was so inadequate, that the insurance of such fleets could not be effected for a less premium than 23 guineas per cent.—therefore in 1807, when (according to his own account, and before the transactions at Zealand had added 40 sail of Danes to the British navy) Great Britain has 1026 vessels of war, and not an hostile squadron dares shew itself on any ocean of the globe; therefore, the force which she can spare for the protection of her West India fleets will be so much more inadequate, and the risk of capture so much greater, than in the American war, that the premium of insurance must necessarily rise to 40 guineas per cent." This is terrible enough; but this is by no means the worst. Jamaica and all the other West Indian islands are to be taken. To facilitate these objects, I suppose all British fleets are to be directed carefully to absent themselves from the West Indian seas. Upon consideration, however, Mr. Medford thinks it possible, that the American troops whom he has dispatched to take Jamaica may be unsuccessful: but, then, he has in reserve for Great Britain a supplementary calamity, equally destructive. The negroes are to revolt. Why, he does not tell us. However, if we may be allowed to form a conjecture from his general plan of argumentation, we may suppose his reasoning to be of this sort: "As the Negroes of Jamaica, before they had any definite evidence of the military strength of that island, remained in quiet and contented submission to their masters, therefore, it follows of course, that as soon as these Negroes discover that this same force is sufficiently strong to repel the whole power of America, they will immediately rise up in arms against it." Nay, even this is not all. Canada too is to be taken, though Mr. Medford thinks "it would not be an advantage to America —though they (the Americans, I suppose) have barren land enough—though like Scotchmen they always go to the South—though the Canadians do not love the Americans—and though *not liking to speak positively without having solid grounds*," (you may well stare, Mr. Cobbett, but these are actually the words) Mr. Mascall "finds *upon inquiry*, that the forces of Massachusets, Vermont, and New Hampshire could not march from Vermont to Quebec, *quite so fast as from London to Liverpool, because the road is not quite so good!!!*"——So much at present for the wicked trash and nonsense of this interested scribbler. I am sorry to soil the pages of your Register with so much of his filth; but as his most unexampled hardihood of groundless assertion might mislead readers on a great national subject, it may be useful to shew, as I have done, that he is perfectly destitute of every claim to the lowest degree of confidence, respect, or attention.—Now, therefore, commending Mr. Mascall Medford to your wholesome correction, and the report of the West Indian committee of the House of Commons to your developement and illustration, I could in particular wish you to direct your attention to that most important fact, (and because most important and decisive against Mr. Mascall, wholly unnoticed by that honest and impartial adviser), stated in the Report p. 6, that "nearly the whole French mercantile marine has been sold to neutrals, under the stipulation of each vessel being returned into French ports, in order to be navigated as French ships, within twelve months after peace; and with the enjoyment during war of the same privileges in the ports of France, as if they were actually French; for instance to import sugar at a duty of 4 shillings per cwt. less, than the duty imposed on sugar imported in neutral vessels." See also the evidence of Mr. Wilson of this, from personal knowledge, p. 56. The question of permitting this (falsely called neutral) intercourse between the French colonies and France, and her dependencies in Europe, is

commonly treated merely as a commercial question, and indeed it is a commercial question of very high moment, but, I apprehend that it has no remote bearing upon naval greatness and every thing belonging to it. At the same time that we maintain our just rights and ancient practices, respecting this (falsely called neutral) trade, and inflict that, which I am persuaded would be felt by Buonaparté, as the severest wound we could inflict on him, by blockading the French and Spanish West Indian colonies, we have the means of conferring a mutual benefit on America and ourselves, by laying open to her the trade with our own West Indian possessions. You are, I am sure, perfectly aware of all the extensive benefits that would result from this measure. I shall, therefore, leave the detail of them to you, and here close this long letter, subscribing myself, A SUBJECT OF ENGLAND, AND NO CITIZEN OF AMERICA.

EXPATRIATION.

Sir;—Notwithstanding the unfavourable description which I have received, from the *cool* and *dispassionate* pen of that profound commentator on the dusty pages of Bracton and Fleta, S. V. who from a disposition for "*manly and liberal animadversion*" has designated me as "abortively vomited from the fissures of alma mater," I shall venture once more to make an appearance in the pages of your valuable Register. S. V., who has attributed to me the crime of *personal scurrility*, has evinced himself, beyond all doubt, to be a *particeps criminis*; but I will satisfy you, Mr. Cobbett, that personality is *solely* the possession of your erudite correspondent. S. V. has chosen to say, that when I used the words, "that the "most uncivilized wretch, or the most li- "centious libertine, could not promulgate "a doctrine more repugnant to integrity, "gratitude, and humanity," that they were personally directed to him. Now, if S. V. will take the trouble of perusing again the passage immediately succeeding, he will find, most indisputably, that they could not have been so intended. The passage immediately following is this: "Were there no "other memorial characteristic of a *French-* "*man's* disposition, this alone would inde- "libly stamp the truth of Voltaire's de- "scription of his countrymen, that in their "exterior they are monkeys, and in their "hearts tigers." Could I, let me ask, be *fairly* construed to have intended any thing by those words personal to S. V.; or were they not clearly and explicitly addressed to the Frenchman Pecquet? The charge of personal abuse, therefore, I am apprehensive must be borne upon the legal colossal shoulders of S. V., who will exclusively enjoy all the merit and demerit attendant upon it. With respect to any prejudice in favour of S. V., his letter did certainly not produce that effect. At a period when the momentous state of this country calls for extraordinary energy for its safety, and when every exertion must prove unavailing, unless her sailors, from affection, or some other powerful stimulus, are united in her defence, I confess I did not entertain any thing like predilection for the man, who could assiduously travel over the musty pages of almost obsolete authors, to drag to light some equivocal passage, which accompanied by a strained and distorted interpretation, might appear to legalize a defection, which if acted upon, must inevitably leave the country a weak and defenceless prey to her enemies. Could I, Sir, believe such a man to be an Englishman, *divested* of *every interest* but what was reconcileable with his country's welfare? Could I, though I should have played the hypocrite in mildness and urbanity as masterly as S. V.; could I have complimented him, without blushing for my own depravity? No, Mr. Cobbett, opposuit natura! No man, Sir, unbiassed by self-interest, ever yet took such extraordinary pains as S V., to discover latent doctrines in mouldy folios, which when published meet with no admiration, but, on the contrary, produce sorrow and regret. If S. V. denies the truth of what I assert, let him consult the effect which his letter had on yourself and correspondents. What was the result of the doctrine on your mind, Mr. Cobbett, whom even the paid hireling has never yet charged with intentional error? What was its effect upon your correspondents? If I am not much mistaken, the absurdity of the doctrine was noticed both by Wroc and R. R. However unpleasant then it may be to S. V., I must in candour inform him, to use his own expression, that I remain in "*dubiety*," how far it is true, that he is neither interested in the funded or landed property of America, notwithstanding he should accompany the assertion with the heart-breaking intelligence, "of how "*few* and *meagre* have been the *briefs*, "whose superscription of a fee have been "visited by the initials S. V."—Let us consider what the proposition is which S. V. would persuade us a *love* of *justice* alone prompts him to spend so many hours to establish:—that if the *amor patriæ* should be insufficient to bind the affections of the subject against the lures held out by her ene-

mies, no duty, no moral, no legal tie of fidelity exists; that the bands of allegiance are loosed; and that the disaffected may expatriate at pleasure. I say such a proposition, if it emanated from the mind spontaneously, indicates a heart unvisited by any of the milder virtues. It stamps the author as a man with whom friendship would be as a rope of sand, which every wind would weaken. If S. V. insist that all this is mere prejudice, let us consider the doctrine first with regard to reason, and next with respect to the law. If expatriation be allowed at all at the will of the subject, it must be allowed without any exception, because S. V. only argues for its existence on the ground of the absence of written authority: the proposition then goes to this extent, that when a subject gets intelligence of an intended invasion of his country, he may at that moment withdraw his allegiance from thence, and give it to the enemy who meditates his country's destruction. I insist, that such a proposition and reason are at variance; that it raises considerable indignation in an honest mind, and conveys no favourable sentiments for the author of it. S. V. may answer, that the King by proclamation can prevent the inconvenience. Admit that; but does that admission lessen ought of the unreasonableness or iniquity of the doctrine. But how can a proclamation remove all the inconvenience and mischief? The disaffected part of the subjects may have emigrated before the proclamation becomes notorious. Ah! says S. V. but common-sense will tell us, that upon the first alarm which government has of a war, it will be expedient *then* to issue the proclamation. What is always expedient to be done in a case that frequently occurs, evidences the necessity of a law; for it argues a very shallow and improvident understanding, to provide by temporary expedients for that which an established rule of law would regulate with more certainty. The reason of the thing, therefore, strongly inculcates the opinion, that the law must have been considered as providing against voluntary alienage. I will now consider the question as affected by law. The indefatigable perseverance of S. V. must have discovered to him before this, that there is a '*lex scripta*,' and a '*lex non scripta*,' a written, and a common law; and, I am acquainted with no better authority to establish the fact, that the common law restricts a British subject from withdrawing his allegiance, than Lord Coke. If S. V. can inform me of a better, I shall be thankful for his information. Lord Coke then says, (non meus hic sermo) "that no man can divest himself of his allegiance to the country in which he was born." Does S. V. possess the modesty to suppose that he is better acquainted with the written law in my Lord Coke's time, than Lord Coke was himself; if not, Lord Coke knew as well as S. V. that no written law prohibited a subject from withdrawing his allegiance. If Lord Coke was familiar with that fact, does S. V. mean to brand with infamy his character, by stating that he asserted that which he knew to be false: if not, it amounts to this; that Lord Coke, when he uttered the dictum which I have quoted, knew that he was stating no written law. But if he did not state what he knew to be incorrect, he must have believed that he was stating what was warranted by the common law; and the result is, that to doubt whether Lord Coke was correct or not, we must believe that which would strain the credulity of the most credulous; namely, that S. V. can inform us with more accuracy the common law in Lord Coke's time, than that great luminary himself. Really, Mr. Cobbett, if *modesty*, and that *humility* which ever attend conscious merit, could win briefs, S. V. could have little occasion to contend for the liberty of expatriating himself at pleasure. S. V. is a great *stickler* for *consistency*: he says, so long as we permit foreigners in this country, we shonld consistently permit our own subjects to expatriate. Now, S. V. should remember, that when we make laws, it is for our own benefit, and not for the advantage of other nations; that if those other nations think it expedient to prohibit expatriation they can do so; but, so long as our enemies invite our subjects to apostacy, I cannot discover that either consistency, or policy, calls upon this country to adopt a different course with their subjects. Indeed, I am unable to discover in the observations and arguments of S. V. any other motive than that of weakening the defence of this country, by an attempt to render her as easy a prey as possible to her enemies. His first plan is to get rid of our own subjects; and, secondly, to admit no foreigners; by which means he would persuade us, that we should evince to surrounding powers an incontestible proof of our wisdom, and should offer to our adversaries an impenetrable bulwark of strength. I trust, however, Mr. Cobbett, that experience has taught us better, than to fall at the first decoy, into a snare of this nature.—I am, &c.——CANDIDUS.—*Lincoln's Inn, Oct.* 28.

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